Reasons To Fire Your Mutual Fund .pany – Enablers Of Poor Corporate Governance-w-inds.

Stocks-Mutual-Funds An entire book could be written about the happy conspiracy between corporate managers and the investment .munity that pads both pockets at the expense of the everyday shareholder. In fact, one has been written. You should check out "The Battle for the Soul of American Capitalism" by John Bogle, the founder of the Vanguard Group. Bogle has been one of the few mutual fund industry luminaries that publicly decry the abuse taking place. It is an easy read. Check it out. Many of my top ten reasons are touched on in this book. Over fifty percent of corporate America is owned by the top 100 financial fiduciaries. One would think that this alone would make them the most vigilant voices in the boardroom. In fact, few mutual funds demand accountability from management, and in many of the most egregious cases, they are guilty of downright aiding and abetting the fudging of numbers and the looting of otherwise good corporations. Why? Two glaring conflicts of interest prevent the industry from be.ing the activists that they should be.e. First, every .pany is a potential client for 401k and pension administration. Over half of invest-able assets are in defined contribution plans (401k, 403b, etc) or defined benefit plans (pensions). .pany management gets to decide who handles these assets on behalf of their employees. Corporate managers who take a dim view of shareholder activism (and who does, except those that are abusing shareholders?) are unlikely to award this business to institutions who meddle too much. Management wants shareholders to blindly follow the re.mendations of management. Shareholders who file corporate resolutions and offer up .peting board slates are not likely to get a piece of the .pany’s investment assets. The second conflict is similar to the first. So many of the mutual fund industry’s parent .panies also have operations in investment banking. They are reluctant to raise hay because offending their management clients may result in their firms being left out in the cold when it .es to investment banking deals. This is really a shame. Mutual funds have the expertise, the resources, and the position to demand accountability from management. Instead, management has used the diffusion of corporate ownership to increase their pay, fudge the numbers, cut sweetheart deals, etc. Bogle calls this a transition from "owners’ capitalism" to "managers’ capitalism". About the Author: 相关的主题文章: